Watermarking protocol of secure verification by Zhang, Jun et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Engineering and Information 
Sciences - Papers: Part A 
Faculty of Engineering and Information 
Sciences 
2007 
Watermarking protocol of secure verification 
Jun Zhang 
University of Wollongong 
Weidong Kou 
Xidian University 
Kai Fan 
Xidian University 
Lei Ye 
University of Wollongong, lei@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers 
 Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zhang, Jun; Kou, Weidong; Fan, Kai; and Ye, Lei, "Watermarking protocol of secure verification" (2007). 
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences - Papers: Part A. 2510. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/2510 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Watermarking protocol of secure verification 
Abstract 
The secure verification is important for watermarking protocols. A malicious arbitrator is able to remove 
an original watermark from an unauthorized copy of the digital content as a result of a security breach in 
the phase of arbitration and resell multiple copies of it with impunity. We propose a novel buyer-seller 
watermarking protocol of secure verification. In this scheme, a seller permutes an original watermark 
provided by a trusted Watermarking Certification Authority (WCA) and embeds it into digital content in an 
encrypted domain. In case an unauthorized copy is found, the seller can recover the original watermark 
from the watermark extracted from the copy and sends it to an arbitrator. Without the knowledge of 
permutations applied by the seller, the arbitrator is unable to remove the permuted watermark from the 
digital content. Hence, verification is secured. As an additional advantage of the proposed protocol, 
arbitration can be conducted without the need for the cooperation of the WCA or the buyer. 
Keywords 
secure, verification, protocol, watermarking 
Disciplines 
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies 
Publication Details 
Zhang, J., Kou, W., Fan, K. & Ye, L. (2007). Watermarking protocol of secure verification. Journal of 
Electronic Imaging, 16 (4), 043002-1-043002-4. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/2510 
Watermarking protocol of secure verification
Jun Zhang
University of Wollongong
School of Information Technology and Computer Science
Wollongong, New South Wales 2522, Australia
E-mail: jz484@uow.edu.au
Weidong Kou
Kai Fan
Xidian University
The State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks
Xi’an 710071, China
Lei Ye
University of Wollongong
School of Information Technology and Computer Science
Wollongong, New South Wales 2522, Australia
Abstract. The secure verification is important for watermarking pro-
tocols. A malicious arbitrator is able to remove an original watermark
from an unauthorized copy of the digital content as a result of a
security breach in the phase of arbitration and resell multiple copies
of it with impunity. We propose a novel buyer-seller watermarking
protocol of secure verification. In this scheme, a seller permutes an
original watermark provided by a trusted Watermarking Certification
Authority (WCA) and embeds it into digital content in an encrypted
domain. In case an unauthorized copy is found, the seller can re-
cover the original watermark from the watermark extracted from the
copy and sends it to an arbitrator. Without the knowledge of permu-
tations applied by the seller, the arbitrator is unable to remove the
permuted watermark from the digital content. Hence, verification is
secured. As an additional advantage of the proposed protocol, arbi-
tration can be conducted without the need for the cooperation of the
WCA or the buyer. © 2007 SPIE and IS&T. DOI: 10.1117/1.2804233
1 Introduction
Digital copyright protection is an important issue in the
development of e-commence. Digital watermarking is a
promising technology for copy protection and copy deter-
rence. A number of digital watermarking algorithms have
been proposed since the introduction of its concept. The
essential idea behind the technology is to trace piracy by
embedding watermarks in digital contents. To protect all
parties’ interests in a digital content transaction, a secure
watermarking protocol is desirable in the process of estab-
lishing piracy. A secure watermarking protocol combines
the digital watermarking techniques with cryptography.
Qiao and Nahrstedt1 first pointed out that the customer’s
right problem exists in the watermarking protocols for trac-
ing piracy. Memon and Wong2 proposed a watermarking
protocol to simultaneously resolve the piracy tracing prob-
lem and the customer’s rights problem. Lei et al.3 ad-
dressed the unbinding problem that exists in Memon and
Wong’s protocol. The secure verification problem is an-
other important issue in the existing watermarking proto-
cols. With the knowledge of a watermark provided by a
seller as undeniable evidence to establish piracy, a mali-
cious arbitrator ARB is able to remove the original wa-
termark from an unauthorized copy and resell multiple cop-
ies of it with impunity. It was expected that asymmetric
watermarking algorithms and watermark zero-knowledge
proofs could resolve the problem.4–7 However, existing
asymmetric watermarking algorithms are not secure enough
and watermark zero-knowledge proof systems are too com-
plex for practical applications.
The work presented in this paper is derived from the
research in Refs. 3 and 8. Lei et al.3 proposed an efficient
and anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol that
successfully resolves the unbinding problem. In addition,
during transactions the buyer can remain anonymous via
the help of a trusted Certification Authority CA that is
responsible to issue normal or anonymous digital certifi-
cates. However, this protocol has some drawbacks. First,
the verification is insecure in the protocol. Second, it is not
easy to simultaneously confine the distortion of the digital
content caused by the watermark embedding and ensure the
robustness of the two watermarks. Third, it is not
convenient—and is therefore undesirable—that the coop-
eration of Watermarking Certification Authority WCA is
required in the phase of arbitration. Kuribayashi and
Tanaka8 proposed a new watermarking scheme that embeds
an information bit in the encrypted domain that ensures the
plain value is not exposed. But the protocol that is based on
additive homomorphic property has several issues. First, it
cannot resolve the unbinding problem. Second, the verifi-
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cation is insecure in the protocol. Third, the use of zero-
knowledge proofs significantly impedes the practicability
of the protocol.
2 New Watermarking Protocol
The main idea of this paper is to resolve the secure verifi-
cation problem and still retain the advantages of the proto-
cols proposed in Refs. 3 and 8. The goals of the proposed
new watermarking protocol are as follows:
1. A novel method is proposed to resolve the secure
verification problem, which is much simpler and
more secure than asymmetric watermark algorithms
and watermark zero-knowledge proofs.
2. When an unauthorized copy is found, the seller and
ARB can perform arbitration to establish piracy with-
out the need for the cooperation of WCA or the
buyer. This further enhances the practicability of the
proposed protocol.
3. Only one watermark is embedded in a digital content
and the distortion of a watermarked digital content
can be effectively confined.
Similar to the protocol in Ref. 3, our proposed protocol
is composed of three subprotocols: the registration proto-
col, the watermarking protocol, and the identification and
arbitration protocol. These subprotocols are described as
follows.
2.1 Registration Protocol
To remain anonymous in transactions, a buyer B randomly
selects a key pair pkB ,skB and sends pkB to CA.
3 When
CA receives pkB, it generates an anonymous certificate,
CertCApkB, and sends it back to B. Then, as B’s pseud-
onym, pkB will be used in a digital content transaction. It is
assumed that CA uses the RSA cryptosystem,9 such that the
key pair pkB ,skB is generated with the RSA algorithm.
If anonymity is not required, B may skip the entire reg-
istration process and use the normal digital certificate.
2.2 Watermarking Protocol
For protecting digital copyrights, B, a seller S, and the
WCA implement the watermarking protocol, which con-
sists of the following steps. The information is exchanged
among B, S, and a trusted WCA in the proposed protocol.
Figure 1 illustrates the flow of information among them and
the details of a transaction in the protocol.
Step 1. For a transaction, B first negotiates with S to set
up a common agreement ARG, which explicitly states the
rights and obligations of them, and specifies the digital con-
tent X. Note that ARG uniquely binds this particular trans-
action to X and contains S’s commitment on the quality of
X.
Then B randomly selects one public-private key pair
pk* ,sk* according to additive homomorphic encryption
algorithms, e.g., the Okamota–Uchiyama cryptosystem10
and the Paillier cryptosystem,11 for this transaction. After
that, B signs ARG, SignpkBARG, and generates an anony-
mous certificate, CertpkBpk
*. In this case, CA assures the
legality of pkB, and pkB, in turn, assures the legality of pk
*.
Finally, B transmits CertCApkB, CertpkBpk
*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG to S.
Step 2. Upon receiving CertCApkB, CertpkBpk
*, ARG,
and SignpkBARG, S verifies the validity of the certificates
and signature. If any of them is invalid, the transaction is
aborted; otherwise, S sends CertpkBpk
*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG to WCA and requests a valid watermark.
Step 3. When WCA receives CertpkBpk
*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG from S, it verifies the validity of the certifi-
cate and the signature and aborts the transaction if either is
invalid. Otherwise, it generates a watermark W
= w1 ,w2 ,w3 , . . . ,wn specific to this transaction, where wi
 0,1 i 1,n. Then WCA encrypts W with pkB to get
EpkBW using the RSA encryption algorithm, and W with
pk* as Epk*W= Epk*w1 ,Epk*w2 ,Epk*w3 , . . . ,Epk*wn
using an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm, re-
spectively. Finally, WCA computes SignWCAEpkBW , pkB,
SignpkBARG and sends it, Epk*W, and EpkBW back to
S.
Step 4. Upon receiving the response, S randomly gener-
ates an reversible permutation function  of degree n spe-
cific to the digital content X to scramble the elements in
Epk*W to get Epk*W=Epk*W=Epk*W
= Epk*w1 ,Epk*w2 ,Epk*w3 , . . . ,Epk*wn,
2 and per-
forms the watermark insertion in the encrypted domain by
computing Epk*X=Epk*X  W=Epk*X  Epk*W.
8
Afterwards, S sends Epk*X to B and stores CertCApkB,
ARG, SignpkBARG, , EpkBW, and SignWCAEpkBW,
pkB ,signpkBARG as a new sales record with respect to
the digital content X.
Step 5. Upon receiving Epk*X, B decrypts it with his
private key sk* by computing X=Dsk*Epk*X and ob-
tains the correctly watermarked copy X.
2.3 Identification and Arbitration Protocol
When an unauthorized copy Y of a certain digital content X
is found, the identification and arbitration protocol is used
to trace and establish piracy with undeniable evidences.
S first extracts the watermark W̃ from Y and then
searches the sales records with respect to X for a match
with the condition EpkB
−1W̃=EpkBW, where 
−1· is
the reverse permutation function. When a match is found, S
Fig. 1 Information flow and details of a transaction in the proposed
protocol.
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computes the original watermark W̃=−1W̃. Then S col-
lects the associated information, CertCApkB, ARG,
SignpkBARG, EpkBW, and SignWCAEpkBW , pkB,
signpkBARG, and sends them with W̃ to ARB. Upon
receiving the information from S, ARB verifies the validity
of the certificates, the signature, and EpkBW̃=EpkBW. If
any of them is invalid, ARB rejects the case. Otherwise,
ARB requests the real identity behind pkB from CA. Once
the real identity of the buyer who owns pkB is revealed,
ARB establishes the piracy against the revealed buyer.
3 Discussions
In this section, we examine how the design goals are
achieved and analyze the security of the proposed water-
marking protocol.
1. All the design goals set up in Section 2 are accom-
plished by the new watermarking protocol.
• The proposed protocol conveniently resolves the se-
cure verification problem. The original watermark W
as undeniable evidence will be verified by ARB to
establish the piracy against the original B, since S em-
beds the permuted watermark W=W into a digital
content in the encrypted domain. Without S’s permu-
tation function , ARB has no knowledge of W and is
unable to remove it from the unauthorized copy to
resell multiple copies of it with impunity. Obviously,
the method of watermark verification is simpler and
securer than asymmetric watermarking algorithms and
watermark zero-knowledge proofs.
• In the identification and arbitration phase, the coopera-
tion of the WCA or B is not required. S extracts the
watermark W̃ from the unauthorized copy and collects
the associated information. Then the seller computes
W̃=−1W̃ using a reverse permutation function and
sends it to ARB. ARB will verify EpkBW̃=EpkBW
and establish the piracy against B, who owns the pub-
lic key pkB.
• In the proposed protocol, only one watermark is em-
bedded in a digital content. When an unauthorized
copy of a digital content X is found, S first extracts a
watermark W̃ from it and then searches the sales
records with respect to X for a match with the condi-
tion EpkB
−1W̃=EpkBW. When a match is found,
S collects the associated information and sends it with
W̃=−1W̃ to ARB. The watermark V for identifying
the malicious B in the watermarking protocols given
in Refs. 2 and 3 is not necessary in our proposed pro-
tocol. Furthermore, the distortion of the watermarked
digital content caused by watermark embedding can
be effectively confined using Kuribayashi and
Tanaka’s8 watermark embedding method.
2. The proposed watermarking protocol can also ad-
dress the following security issues.
• For the piracy tracing problem, because B has no
knowledge of the original digital content X and the
permuted watermark W, B is unable to remove
W from a watermarked digital content X. In addi-
tion, the proposed protocol provides a mechanism to
unambiguously identify the malicious B once an un-
authorized copy originated from B is found.
• For the customer’s right problem, because S does not
know the watermark W, S cannot produce a water-
marked copy to frame B, since S gets no access to the
watermarked copy of the digital content in its final
form.
• For the unbinding problem, because the signature
SignWCAEpkBW , pkB ,signpkBARG explicitly binds
W to ARG, which uniquely specifies a particular digi-
tal content X, it is impossible for S to transplant the
watermark into another copy of a higher-priced digital
content.
• For the anonymity problem, similar to the protocol of
Lei et al.,3 the anonymity of B can be retained during
the transaction with the assistance of CA unless ARB
adjudges B to be guilty of piracy.
3. Considering the tradeoff between the robustness and
the capacity, in the protocol by Kuribayashi and
Tanaka8 proposed, the watermark information has 32
bits. In our protocol, in order to prevent S from easily
guessing the watermark W according to EpkBW, the
length of W should be large enough, e.g., 512. We can
improve both the robustness and the capacity of the
watermark using the image-adaptive data hiding
method given in Ref. 12. By the way, since the addi-
tive homomorphic encryption algorithms, such as the
Okamota–Uchiyama cryptosystem10 and the Paillier
cryptosystem,11 are random encryption algorithms, S
is unable to guess the information bit according to
Epk*wi, i 1,n.
4. B and S need to exchange information only once in
our proposed protocol. B first sends a purchase order
including CertCApkB, CertpkBpk
*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG to S, and then S sends the encrypted
watermarked digital content Epk*X back to B. In a
digital content transaction, B is not required to con-
tact anyone else except S.3 To get a digital content, B
contacts S and provides the necessary information to
S. Upon receiving the purchase order from B, S pro-
duces a watermarked digital content and delivers it to
B, which completes the simple buyer-seller collabo-
ration cycle.
5. Compared to Lei et al.’s protocol3 and Kuribayashi
and Tanaka’s protocol,8 the protocol proposed in this
paper is securer and simpler. In addition, the amount
of data transmitted is reduced and the practicability is
improved. Our proposed protocol is well suitable for
practical applications.
4 Conclusions
This paper proposed a watermarking protocol of secure
verification based on PKI. A number of improvements are
achieved over recent protocols in Section 3, which include
the following:
1. A novel method is proposed to resolve the secure
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verification problem, which is much simpler and se-
curer than asymmetric watermarking algorithms and
watermark zero-knowledge proofs.
2. ARB can determine whether the buyer produces the
unauthorized copy according to the information pro-
vided by the seller without the need for the coopera-
tion of the WCA or the buyer.
3. Only one watermark is embedded in a digital content,
and the distortion of a watermarked digital content
can be effectively confined.
4. The proposed protocol can also address the security
problems in protocols discussed in Section 3. As a
result, it is well suitable for practical applications.
Because the security of the watermarking protocols
highly depends on the security and robustness of the under-
lying watermarking algorithms, our future work will in-
clude development of better watermarking algorithms that
can operate in an encrypted domain.
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